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Contemplation, intellectus and simplex intuitus in Aquinas: Recovering a Neoplatonic 
Theme.1  
 
Rik Van Nieuwenhove 
 
Abstract. This contribution examines two related points in relation to Aquinas’s 
understanding of contemplation (a sorely neglected topic in scholarship). First, (a) after 
having outlined that the final act of contemplation culminates in an intellective (or non-
discursive), simple apprehension of the truth (especially divine truth) I will examine how this 
act relates to the three operations of the intellect (grasping of quiddity; judgement; reasoning) 
Aquinas identifies in a number of places. This brings me to a second, more substantial claim, 
namely, (b) that his view of contemplation as simple insight is significantly indebted to 
Neoplatonic sources: therefore, we cannot interpret Aquinas’s views on contemplation in 
Aristotelian terms solely but we must also pay attention to the way he introduces Neoplatonic 
elements into his Aristotelian framework. I conclude this contribution by suggesting some 
reasons—of a theological nature—why Aquinas would have been drawn towards a non-
discursive or ‘intuitive’ notion of contemplation. 
 
 
                                                          
1 An initial draft of this paper was presented in October 2015 at University of Notre Dame; I 
am deeply grateful to Professor Joseph Wawrykow for his encouragement and giving me the 
opportunity to share my work. I would also like to thank wholeheartedly Dr Katja Krause, 
University of Durham, and the reviewers of ACPQ for their many constructive suggestions 
and highly detailed and most expert critique of an earlier draft of this paper. 
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Some years ago Thomas Hibbs noted that it is “surprising how little attention” has been 
devoted by Thomist scholars to the topic of contemplation, despite the pivotal role it occupies 
in how Aquinas conceives of the good life.2 It is fair to say that this observation stands, 
despite some recent contributions.3 While important scholarship has considered in detail 
Aquinas’s views on the beatific vision and his indebtedness to Islamic and early-Latin 
                                                          
2 Thomas S. Hibbs, “Interpretations of Aquinas’s Ethics since Vatican II” in Stephen Pope 
(ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 421. For the 
importance of contemplation for human fulfilment, see for instance ST I-II, q. 3, a. 5; ST II-II, 
q. 180, a. 4: contemplatio divinae veritatis… est finis totius humanae vitae.  
3 Apart from a rather brief (and somewhat abrasive) discussion of Aquinas’s notion of 
contemplation by Simon Tugwell in his book Albert and Thomas. Selected Writings. Classics 
of Western Spirituality (NY: Paulist Press, 1988), 279–86, a helpful discussion in Bernard 
McGinn’s The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany. Vol. IV of The Presence of God.  
A History of Western Christian Mysticism (NY: Herder & Herder, 2005), 27–38 and a recent 
study by Edyta Imai (dealing with contemplation and emotions), entitled Thomas Aquinas on 
Contemplation and the Human Animal (Saarbrücken: Scholars’ Press, 2013) relatively little 
has been published in the English-speaking world on the subject in the last forty years. In the 
francophone world Jean-Pierre Torrell has engaged with the subject, and there is a probing 
article by Adriano Oliva in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 96 (2012): 
585–662, entitled “La Contemplation des Philosophes selon Thomas d’Aquin.” Before this 
we need to go back to Josef Pieper’s Happiness and Contemplation (IN: St Augustine Press, 
1996), which explicitly addresses the intellective nature of contemplation. 
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sources,4 the topic of contemplation remains rather neglected.  
In this contribution I want to revisit this theme, and discuss two related points. First, (a) I will 
outline that the final act of contemplation culminates in an intellective (or non-discursive), 
simple apprehension of the truth (especially divine truth)5 and I will examine how this simple 
insight into truth relates to the three operations of the intellect (grasping of quiddity; 
judgement; reasoning) Aquinas identifies in a number of places in his writings. This brings 
me to a second claim, namely, (b) that his view of contemplation as simple insight or intuitus 
simplex is significantly indebted to Neoplatonic sources: therefore, we cannot interpret 
Aquinas’s views on contemplation in Aristotelian terms solely but we must also pay attention 
to the way he introduces Neoplatonic elements into his Aristotelian framework. 
 
In relation to (a): my claim is not simply that contemplation involves the theoretical 
intellect (nous, intellectus), as distinct from the practical intellect. This would be a trivial 
claim. It is more specific: Aquinas characterises the acme of the contemplative act in terms 
of intuitus simplex,6 a notion which has received little attention in recent scholarship. Given 
                                                          
4 For a recent contribution on Latin sources, with helpful references to literature, see Katja 
Krause, “Remodelling Ultimate Human Happiness: Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on the 
Sentences and his Sources,” Divus Thomas 118 (2015): 15–56. 
5 ST II-II, q. 180, a. 4 
6 There are a number of studies on the topic of “intuition” of the intellect in Aquinas: Michel 
Nodé-Langlois, “L’Intuitivité de l’intellect selon Thomas D’Aquin,” Revue Thomiste 100 
(2000): 179–203; Régis Jolivet, “L’Intuition Intellectuelle,” Revue Thomiste 37 (1932): 52–
70; Thomas Fay, “The Intellectual Intuition in Thomas Aquinas,” Sapienza 27 (1974): 352–9. 
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Aquinas’s indisputable debt to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics7 claim (b) is perhaps the more 
surprising one, although it coheres with recent re-readings of Aquinas that are more sensitive 
to his non-Aristotelian sources, especially in his moral theology and metaphysics. Still, even 
those scholars (Bradley, Tugwell, Sommers) who do discuss contemplation in Aquinas have 
paid insufficient attention to the intellective nature of contemplation (claim a), and the 
distinction between intellectus and ratio that is so central to it.8 A recent contribution by 
Mary Catherine Sommers, no matter how helpful otherwise, also fails to mention the non-
                                                          
See also chapter 4 from Therese Scarpelli-Cory, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
7 See for instance ST II-II, q. 182, a. 1 where Aquinas offers eight reasons why he considers 
the contemplative life more excellent (potior, excellentius, melior) than the active life: each 
argument—perhaps somewhat provocatively—contains a reference to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, side by side with one to a Christian source (usually Scripture, or 
Augustine or Gregory the Great).   
8 In his wide-ranging and comprehensive book Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. Reason 
and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science (Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1997) Denis Bradley does not pay any major attention to the distinction 
between ratio and intellectus, or the intellective nature of contemplation on earth. The same 
observation applies to Simon Tugwell’s admittedly short treatment of contemplation in his 
book Albert and Thomas, 279–86, and Edyta Imai’s book Thomas Aquinas on Contemplation 
and the Human Animal. Bernard McGinn, in a characteristically brilliant contribution, 
discusses the intuitive aspect on p. 32 of The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany. 
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discursive aspect of contemplation, and the contrast between intellectus and ratio.9 Hence, 
with the exception of McGinn’s brief discussion, we have to go back to Bernard Lonergan’s 
articles (which originally appeared in the 1940s and which were republished in his book 
Verbum)—although they dealt mainly with understanding rather than with contemplation as 
such—and Josef Pieper’s Happiness and Contemplation, originally published (in German) in 
1958.  In short, during the last sixty years the non-discursive nature of Aquinas’s notion of 
contemplation has not received any major scholarly attention.  
The distinction between ratio and intellectus had been discussed in Pierre Rousselot’s book, 
L’Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas, published first in 1908, and was treated at length in the 
study by Julien Péghaire, Intellectus et Ratio selon Thomas d’Aquin published in 1936. While 
both authors should be credited with reminding us of the distinction between intellect and 
reason, neither examined in any detail the importance of this distinction for our understanding 
of the Thomist notion of contemplation.10   
                                                          
9 In fairness, her contribution is part of a collection of essays in which the influence of 
Aristotle on Aquinas is being highlighted. If my argument holds, this lacuna is not surprising 
in that context: Mary Catherine Sommers, “Contemplation and Action in Aristotle and 
Aquinas” from Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (eds), Aristotle in Aquinas’s Theology 
(Oxford: OUP, 2015), 167–86.  
10 There is an English translation of Rousselot’s seminal work by Andrew Mallon as Pierre 
Rousselot. Intelligence. Sense of Being, Faculty of God. Vol. I of The Collected Philosophical 
Works (Marquette: Marquette University Press, 1999). Julien Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio 
selon Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1936) retains its value. I should also mention in this 
context Bernard Lonergan’s Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. Collected Work of Bernard 
Lonergan. Vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
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As is well-known, ratio covers a wide range of meanings in scholastic thought, such as 
concept, intention, definition, exemplar, idea, cause, proof, meaning, and ratio particularis or 
cogitative power. In what follows I will use it as denoting our capacity for, or act of 
discursive reasoning. In a general sense it is the act or capacity which distinguishes humans 
from separate intelligences (angels and God).11 Aquinas uses ratio to refer to both the act of 
discursive reasoning12 or to the faculty of human intelligence in general, which operates 
discursively, although not exclusively so. In both cases—as act or faculty—the discursive 
dimension is being contrasted with the intellective one.13  In ST I, q. 59, a. 1, ad1, for 
instance, we read: “the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process 
                                                          
11 See for instance De Ver. q. 24, a. 3, ad1 
12 As in ST II-II, q. 49, a. 5, ad3 
13 See also De Ver. q. 24, a. 3, ad1: “Reason is sometimes taken broadly for any immaterial 
cognition; and in this sense reason is found in God (…). It is also taken properly, as meaning 
a power which knows with discourse (cum discursu). In this sense reason is not found in God 
or the angels, but only in men.”  Other key texts which emphasise the distinction between 
ratio and intellectus include: I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, ad4 (with a reference to Ps-Dionysius); II 
Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 8, ad1 (Ps-Dionysius); De Ver. q. 5, a. 1, ad5 (with a reference to Boethius); 
q. 8, a. 15 (Ps-Dionysius); q. 15, a. 1 (Boethius and Ps-Dionysius); q. 24, a. 3 (no reference); 
Expos. De Trin. q. 2, a. 2 (no reference); q. 6, a. 1 (Boethius); ST I, q. 58, a. 3 (no reference) 
and a. 4 (Ps.-Dionysius); I, q. 59, a. 1, ad1 (no reference); I, q. 79, a. 8 (Ps-Dionysius); I, q. 
79, a. 8, ad2 (Boethius); II-II, q. 8, a. 1 obj. 2 (Ps-Dionysius); I, q. 83, a. 4 (no reference); II-
II, q. 9, a. 1, ad1 (no reference); II-II, q. 180, a. 3 (Ps-Dionysius). 
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of discursion from one thing to another.”14  
 
Intellectus and its cognates also cover a wide range of meanings.  In De Ver. q. 17, a. 1 
Aquinas writes that the term intellectus sometimes signifies the thing understood (res 
intellecta); sometimes, it signifies the intellective power itself (potentia intellectiva); 
sometimes a habit; and sometimes an act.  In what follows I will focus mainly on three of 
these meanings, namely the faculty of understanding in general, the activity of human 
understanding, and the habit of intellectus. As a habitus it can refer to the intellectual virtue 
of understanding (which Aristotle refers to in his Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1140b30); or it can 
refer to one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit mentioned in Is. 11.2-3—a topic I will be touching 
upon towards the end of this contribution. 
 
As will become clearer, intellectus, as distinct from discursive ratio, refers to understanding 
in an immediate fashion, either as angels do who enjoy an intellective intuition through the 
intermediary of the innate intelligible species, or as humans do: in our case it refers to the 
moment of insightful understanding, which remains distinct from, but grounds and fulfils, the 
ratiocinative process;15and it is in this crowning act that contemplation comes to fruition. 
 
                                                          
14 For all translations from Aquinas’s works (with the exception of Sent.) I have borrowed 
from www. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ 
15 See, for instance: II Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 8, ad1: In cognitionem veritatis ratio inquirendo 
perveniat, quam intellectus simplici intuitu videt; ST I, q. 59, a. 1, ad1: Intellectus et ratio 
differunt quantum ad modum cognoscendi: quia scilicet intellectus cognoscit simplici intuitu, 
ratio vero discurrendo de uno in aliud. 
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Let us open the discussion with a major quotation from ST I, q. 79, a. 8. Reiterating an 
argument he had made more extensively in De Ver. q. 15, a. 1. Aquinas argues that intellectus 
and ratio are not different powers. However, the one faculty of human cognition has 
nonetheless two distinct operations, a rational-discursive and an intellective one:  
Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this 
clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to 
apprehend intelligible truth (intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem 
apprehendere): and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so 
as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, 
possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one 
thing to another; but they apprehend the truth simply and without mental discursion, as 
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. VII). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth 
by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, 
therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to 
possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since 
movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at 
rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery (secundum 
viam inquisitionis vel inventionis), advances from certain things simply understood—
namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment (in via iudicii) returns by 
analysis (resolvendo) to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has 
found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different 
powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a 
thing is moved towards a certain place. 
The full implications of this quotation will become clearer throughout this paper, especially 
after we have compared it with ST II-II, q. 180, a. 3. For now I mention the following points, 
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which will detain our attention:  first, reason and intellect, while not different powers 
(potentiae), are nonetheless distinct, “as movement is to rest.” This echoes Boethius’s De 
Consol. Phil. IV,16 which Aquinas routinely refers to when contrasting ratio and intellectus, 
such as in De Ver. q. 15, a. 1, or Expos. De Trin. q. 6, a. 1.  We will discuss a number of these 
passages below.  Secondly, as is the case here as well, when describing how through a 
process of discursive reasoning we arrive at knowledge of simple intelligible truth, Aquinas 
also regularly—perhaps more often—refers to the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. Finally (and 
related to this), he claims that through our intellective knowledge we share, no matter how 
inadequately, in angelic knowledge, which is purely intuitive or non-discursive: “human 
nature, insofar as it comes in contact with the angelic nature, must both in speculative and 
practical matters know truth without investigation.”17 Hence, we cannot fully grasp what 
Aquinas has to say on intellection and contemplation without touching on the topic of angelic 
cognition. I will return to the two ways of reasoning (i.e., the via inventionis and the via 
iudicii) at a later stage as well.  For now, let’s simply note (to be explained in greater detail 
when discussing ST II-II, q. 180, a. 3) that the acme of contemplation consists in simple 
                                                          
16 There are two passages from De Consol. Phil. which Aquinas regularly quotes: IV, prosa 
6: Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem 
tempus, ad punctum medium circulus, ita est fati series mobilis ad prouidentiae stabilem 
simplicitatem. (see for instance: ST I, q. 79, a. 8, obj. 2 and Aquinas’s reply 2), and V 4, 
where Boethius distinguishes between sensus, imaginatio, ratio, and intellegentia. In relation 
to the latter he writes: Intelligentiae vero celsior oculus exsistit; supergressa namque 
universitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur. 
17 De Ver. q. 16, a. 1 
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apprehension of truth. How it relates to the three operations of the intellect will be discussed 
now.  
 
I. 
The Three Operations of the Intellect and the Crowning Contemplative Act 
 
In accordance with the third book of De Anima (III, 6; 430a26ff) and other loci in the 
Aristotelian corpus, Aquinas usually identifies only two operations of the intellect, i.e., the 
understanding of indivisibles, through which we apprehend the essence of a thing, and 
combining (affirmation) and distinguishing (negation) in judgement.18   
 
The first operation consists in the understanding of indivisibles or the grasping the quiddity of 
things, and this occurs in a twofold sense.  It can refer to perception of something at an 
inchoative level which, for Aquinas, involves the agent intellect. Here no falsity can occur.19 
                                                          
18In Meta. VI lect. 4 (no. 1232): “The intellect has two operations. One of these is called the 
understanding of indivisibles, and this is the operation by which the intellect forms simple 
concepts of things by understanding the whatness of each one of them. The other operation is 
that by which the intellect combines and separates.” See also In Meta. IV lect. 6 (no. 605); In 
De An. III, lect. 9 (nos 760–2); De Ver. q. 14, a. 1; I Sent. d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad7; Expos. De 
Trin. q. 5, a. 3; compare De Ver. q. 1, a.12.  
19 As the sensing of proper sensibles is always true, so the intellect is always true in knowing 
what a thing is. Cf. De Ver. q. 1, a. 12; ST I, q. 17, a. 3: “the intellect is not deceived about 
the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object.” See also, amongst other 
places: ST I, q. 85, a. 6 and a. 6, ad1. For a discussion of Aquinas’s views on this, see John 
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It is the outcome of a complex process, the details of which need not detain us here. 
Simplifying matters we can summarise as follows: after receiving the sensible species a 
phantasm is generated, from which the agent intellect abstracts an intelligible species, which 
is transformed into a mental concept (e.g., “a fly”).20   The first operation of the intellect can 
also refer, secondly, to grasping the essence of something after a process of reasoning, and 
this is the result of a laborious process, which is prone to error.21   
The second act refers to composition and division of things that are understood. Aquinas calls 
this judgement (e.g., “Socrates is white.”). 
 
In the Prooemium to the Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, however, he 
mentions a third operation, which is proper to reasoning itself (as discursive-ratiocinative): “it 
is the act by which we proceed from one thing to another, so as to arrive at a knowledge of 
                                                          
Jenkins, “Aquinas on the veracity of the intellect” in The Journal of Philosophy (1991): 623–
32 and Norman Kretzmann, “Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, Supp. vol. 17 (1991): 159–94  
20 For a helpful and concise outline, see Eleonore Stump, “The mechanisms of cognition” 
from her book Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), 244–76; and Robert Pasnau, Thomas 
Aquinas on Human Nature. A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae Ia 75-89 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 267–329. 
21 In Summa contra Gentiles III, 91.5 Aquinas points out that our grasp of the quiddity of 
things in this sense is fallible: “We, however, make guesses as to the quiddities of things from 
their accidents and effects.” See Martin Pickavé, “Human Knowledge” in Brian Davies and 
Eleonore Stump, The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 311–26, at 323. 
See also Kretzmann, “Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance.” 
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the unknown from the known.” 22 As this quotation suggests, identifying a third act allows 
Aquinas to explain how new knowledge can be generated through a process of reasoning. In 
this context Aquinas considers, in turn, three different kinds of reasoning processes, 
depending on the degree of certainty we attain. The first is the way of judgement (via iudicii), 
which leads to scientia or certain knowledge. By way of judgement we return by analysis to 
first principles, in light of which we examine what we have found (in via iudicii, resolvendo 
redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat).23  Here we judge with certitude about 
effects by resolving them into their first principles.24  The second process is inquiry (via 
inquisitionis vel inventionis), by which we advance from certain things simply understood, 
namely first principles (secundam viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam 
                                                          
22 In Post. An. I, Prooemium. I have used the English translation by Richard Berquist from St 
Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (IN: Dumb Ox Books, 
2007). See also ST I, q. 85, a. 5 for the three cognitive acts. 
23 ST I, q. 79, a. 8 
24 Although I cannot develop it within the constraints of this contribution, it should be 
mentioned that this ‘analytic’ move should not be misinterpreted in terms of Cartesian 
deduction. In the words of Paul Durbin: “Aristotle and St Thomas do not begin with self-
evident principles and derive conclusions therefrom in a rationalist-deductive mode (…); 
rather, they begin with a statement to be justified (…) and ‘reduce’ it back to its ultimate 
explanatory principles.” Paul Durbin, trans., St Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, vol. 12 
(NY: Blackfriars and McGraw-Hill, 1968), 82 note, quoted by Stump, Aquinas, 239. Thus we 
reach scientia, by finding causal explanations for things (Cf. In Post. An. II.1: scire est 
causam rei cognoscere).  
13 | P a g e  
 
simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia).25 Here we do not always arrive at certitude, 
and what is discovered must therefore be submitted to judgement before certitude is 
possible.26 Aquinas enumerates various degrees among the rational processes which lack 
certitude but within the confines of this paper there is no need to elaborate on these.27 In a 
third rational process we fail to attain truth.28 
 
Of the three cognitive operations Aquinas identifies, both the first—grasping the quiddity—
and the second operation are non-discursive or intellective.29 When we grasp the first 
                                                          
25 ST I, q. 79, a. 8 
26 In Post. An. I, Prooemium: Nam inventio non semper est cum certitudine. 
27 As Aquinas explains in the Prooemium of In Post An., dialectics starts from probable 
premises. Here our reason fully accepts one view, though not without some fear that the 
opposite view might be true. Rhetoric concerns the rational process in which we are inclined 
towards one view, without fully accepting it. In poetics we are drawn towards a view by a 
kind of regard or esteem resulting from the way something is represented.   
28 Sophistics concerns itself with this, as Aquinas observes in Prooemium of In Post. An.  
29 See also De Ver. q. 15, a. 1, ad5: “In us, it is the same faculty [a] which knows the simple 
quiddities of things, [b] which forms propositions, and [c] which reasons. The last of these is 
proper to reason, as reason; the other two can also belong to understanding, as understanding. 
Hence, the second is found in angels, since they know through many species, but only the 
first is found in God, who understands all things, simple and composite, by knowing his own 
essence.” See also De Ver. q. 8, a. 15 (after quoting De Div. Nom. VII.3): “just as we know 
principles by simple intuition without discourse, so do the angels know all they know in the 
same fashion.” 
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principles of knowledge—whether they be universal concepts such as ens or universal 
judgements (such as the principle of non-contradiction)—we do so in an immediate and 
intuitive manner.30  Aquinas often describes the first operation by developing an analogy with 
our sense impressions, adopted from Aristotle’s De Anima III.6 (430b27), and in this context 
he likes to use visual metaphors:31 the intellect perceives (speculetur) the universal in the 
individual (ST I, q. 84, a. 7); the intellect can behold (intueri) the intelligible object in its 
                                                          
30 Denis Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good…, 328–30 makes the stronger claim 
that Aquinas does not hesitate to attribute the term ‘simple apprehension’ to non-discursive 
judgements which are the first principles of theoretical and practical reason, but the texts he 
cites (with the possible exception of II Sent. d. 24, q. 3, a. 1) appear inconclusive. Aquinas 
usually associates simplex apprehensio with the first operation rather than the second, and 
this is not surprising, given the fact that Aristotle (De An. 430b26) had claimed that truth 
cannot be found in simple apprehension but rather in judgement. As Aquinas comments In 
De An. III, lect. 11 (no. 760): “For truth and falsehood consist in a certain adequation or 
comparison of one thing to another, as when the mind combines or distinguishes; but not in 
the intelligible object taken by itself.” (See also De Ver. q. 1. a. 3 where apprehension is 
associated with the first operation, in contrast to judgement: “the intellect judges about the 
thing it has apprehended at the moment when it says something is or is not (iudicat intellectus 
de re apprehensa quando dicit aliquid esse vel non esse). This is the role of intellect 
composing and dividing.” Also De Ver. q. 10, a. 8: “the concurrence of two elements, 
apprehension and judgement about the thing apprehended, is necessary for knowledge.” 
31 Aquinas comments In De An. III, lect. 11 (no. 762): “essence (quod quid est) is what the 
intellect first knows; hence, just as sight is infallible with respect to its proper object, so is the 
intellect with respect to essence.”  
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intelligible species (cf. ST I, q. 58, a. 2, ad2)32 while in De Ver. q. 15, a. 1, ad7 we read: “the 
gaze of our understanding (intuitus nostri intellectus) first fastens on the nature of sensible 
things.”33 By using these visual metaphors he reminds his readers of the non-discursive 
nature of the first operation. Interestingly, Aquinas applies the phrase “intellective vision” 
(visio intellectualis) to both human and angelic apprehension of the quiddity of things.34  
Still, our intellect cannot, in a flash of insight, distinguish essence from accident; such insight 
is possible for us, but only as the result of experience and deliberation.35 With the exceptions 
                                                          
32 Also: De Ver. q. 2, a. 6: “the nature of the species by which it [the intellect] sees” (et 
speciei per quam intuetur).  Again, in Summa contra Gentiles III, 41.1 he compares 
intellective knowing with sensory vision, writing that “a thing whose likeness exists in the 
intellect is known through the intellect by way of vision, just as the likeness of a thing which 
is seen corporeally is present in the sense of the viewer” (res enim illa per intellectum visionis 
modo cognoscitur, cuius similitudo in intellectu existit, sicut et similitudo rei corporaliter 
visae est in sensu videntis). 
33 Of course, as De Ver. q. 2, a. 9, ad3 makes clear, the analogy between the intellective 
grasping of something, and visual perception, is nothing but a metaphor.  
34 ST I, q. 57, a. 1, ad2: “it is said (De Anima III.6; 430b28) that the object of the intellect is 
‘what a thing is,’ regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its proper 
sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and 
angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real 
natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in 
either case there is intellectual vision” (Et utrorumque est visio intellectualis). 
35 R. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 329. Aquinas writes: “If our intellect could 
immediately perceive (videret) the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never 
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of an inchoative grasp of things (“a fly”) and the understanding of first principles (of which 
we have an immediate, intellective grasp), we need the operations of judgement and 
reasoning to acquire knowledge of things. In short, following Aristotle, Aquinas conceives 
the first two operations in intellective terms, although we need ratiocination to advance from 
one thing understood to another, so as to come to know an intelligible truth.36  
 
It seems, however, that Aquinas associates contemplation in the strict sense primarily with 
the non-discursive, simple understanding which crowns the three operations: strictly 
speaking, contemplation does not extend to all intellective dimensions of the operations of the 
intellect, but only to the simple grasp of truth in which these operations come to fulfilment. 
To substantiate this claim, two observations must be made. First, it should be noted that the 
three operations—namely the grasping of indivisibles, composition and division, and 
reasoning—are clearly ordered towards one another. In the “Introduction” to his Exposition 
of Aristotle’s On Interpretation, Aquinas explains that the first operation is ordered to the 
second, and the second to the third. This third operation, reasoning, finds its term and 
fulfilment in intellective rest of understanding and simplex intuitus, which is the ultimate goal 
of our cognitive process. In short, the first operation—grasping the quiddity—is ordered 
                                                          
understand by discursion and reasoning (discurrendo et ratiocinando). In like manner, if the 
intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the subject were at once to have knowledge of all 
that can be attributed to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by 
composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence.” (ST I, q. 58, a. 4) 
36 ST I, q. 79, a. 8: Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere. 
Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem 
cognoscendam. 
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towards the second operation, namely the formation of judgements; and judgements, in turn, 
enable us to reason—the third operation—which comes to fruition in the insight of 
intellectus.37  Secondly, Aquinas states that the understanding that arises from the operations 
of the intellect constitutes the culminating act of contemplation. Hence, contemplation is 
especially associated with the intuitive, simple, non-discursive act which fulfils and crowns 
the other operations.38 This is the main thesis of ST II-II, q. 180, a. 3. In that article Aquinas 
raises the question whether there are various acts (actus) in the contemplative life. He first 
reiterates that while angels perceive truth by simple apprehension, we arrive at a gaze (or 
insight) into simple truth by progressive steps from a plurality of things (angelus simplicii 
apprehensione veritatem intuetur; homo autem quodam processu ex multis pertingit ad 
intuitum simplicis veritatis). He then states: 
Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed 
(finaliter perficitur), namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its 
unity. Yet is has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to 
the reception of principles (acceptatio principiorum), from which it proceeds to the 
contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles 
(deductio principiorum), the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the last and 
crowning act (ultimus autem completivus actus) is the contemplation of the truth. 
                                                          
37 De Ver. q. 14, a. 9: When we attain this understanding or comprehension of things “the 
gaze of the intellect is fixed” (intuitus intellectus in eis figatur) on them, and we give assent 
to them “because of the witness of our own understanding.” 
38 See ST II-II, q.180, a. 6, ad2: “In contemplation discoursing must be laid aside (cessante 
discursu) and the soul’s gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth.” 
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I take the acceptatio principiorum from which we proceed towards truth, and the deductio 
principiorum to refer to the two reasoning processes discussed earlier (cf. ST I, q. 79, a. 8), 
namely, the via inventionis and the via iudicii. From the conclusion Aquinas draws it is clear 
that these two reasoning processes culminate, and come to fruition in, an intellective 
understanding, which is the acme and fulfilment of contemplation. Thus, while the two 
operations Aquinas usually identifies (grasping the quiddity, and composition and division) 
are intellective in nature, contemplation is especially associated with the simple, non-
discursive understanding which crowns our reasoning processes. It is the moment of insight 
which follows upon, and crowns, the discursive reasoning process and which, in turn, makes 
further reasoning possible in a circular movement: “the discourse of reason always begins 
from an understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by proceeding from 
certain understood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected when we come to 
understand what previously did not know.”39  It is this terminus of human reasoning which is 
the high-point of human understanding; it is this which mirrors the intellective operation of 
angels, as we will see; and it is this which pertains especially to contemplation.  
 
This raises the question: What is the status of this contemplative act of intuitive 
understanding? Is it a fourth act, distinct from, and perhaps irreducible to, the previous three 
acts? If this could be shown to be the case, it would strengthen my claim that Aquinas 
transcends the Aristotelian framework, not simply by identifying a third operation beside the 
apprehension of indivisibles and judgement, but by claiming that contemplation actually 
culminates perhaps in an extra, crowning act (ultimus autem completivus actus).   
 
                                                          
39 ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad2. 
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Someone could counter, however, that there are a number of texts that sit uneasily with such 
a reading. After all, there are many texts in which Aquinas equates understanding with the 
grasping of essence, or judgement. Thus, in Aristotelian terms, the understanding that ensues 
from our reasoning process (the third operation) can be characterised perfectly well as an 
instance of either the first operation (more particularly, a second-stage first act, in which we 
fully grasp the essence), or the second operation; it does not necessarily have to be another 
act beyond the three already identified.40  Furthermore, Aquinas’s characterisation of human 
knowing in terms of circularity41 seems also to be at odds with reading ST II-II, q. 180, a. 3 as 
implying that our understanding culminates in a fourth, irreducible act.  
 
While I grant these points, it should be remembered that question 180, article 3 specifically 
concerns contemplation, rather than understanding in general. It is not clear that 
contemplation and understanding can simply be equated: the former is more specific, 
                                                          
40 The same line of argument applies to the generation of the inner word. Aquinas contrasts 
cogitatio or discursive thinking, and the word, which is “formed according to perfect 
contemplation of the truth.”  (see In Joh. ch. 1 lect. 1, no. 26; also: De Pot. q. 8, a. 1 and q. 9, 
a. 5). Now, this inner word can be either concept or judgement, as Bernard Lonergan pointed 
out in Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 17. Lonergan refers in this context to De Ver. q. 
11, a. 1 to back up his point that conceptions of the intellect can be complex, or simple.  
41 Intellectus occurs, not just at the beginning of a process of reasoning but also when genuine 
understanding occurs at the end of a reasoning process, creating a dynamic circularity. See 
De Ver. q. 10, a. 8, ad10: “the circularity is observed in this, that reason reaches conclusions 
from principles by way of discovery, and by way of judgement examines the conclusions 
which have been found, analysing them back to the principles.”  
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referring to a non-discursive insight (intuitus) into primarily divine truth, while understanding 
covers a broader range.42  Hence, contemplative understanding could still be interpreted as an 
act which cannot be fully captured in terms of the three operations. More importantly, q.180, 
a. 3 appears to make a fairly clear distinction between the many acts whereby it arrives at this 
unity [of contemplating truth], and the final contemplative act itself (contemplativa vita (…) 
habet  autem multos actus quibus pervenit ad hunc actum finalem).43  Finally, there is an 
                                                          
42 The range of intellectus is much broader, as Aquinas makes clear in ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1. 
Having reiterated his etymological view that intellectus is derived from intus legere, 
penetrating into the essence of things, he goes on to say: “Now there are many kinds of things 
that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. 
Thus, under the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies 
hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth they denote lies hidden (because 
the intelligible world is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is 
perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may 
speak of understanding (intellectus) with regard to all these things.” While contemplation 
extends to created effects, Aquinas associates the contemplative life primarily—but not 
exclusively—with contemplation of divine truth. See ST II-II, q. 180, a. 4: “That which 
belongs principally (principaliter) to the contemplative life is the contemplation of divine 
truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole human life.” See also ST II-II, q. 
180, a. 7 and q. 181, a. 4, ad2. 
43 See also ST II-II, q. 180, a. 6, ad2: after he has explained that the discoursing of reason 
should be put aside in contemplation, he writes: “This is done by directing all the soul’s 
operations to the simple contemplation of the intelligible truth (omnes operationes animae 
reducuntur ad simplicem contemplationem intelligibilis veritatis), and this is indicated by his 
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important hint in ST II-II, q. 180, a. 4 how Aquinas sees the relation between the final 
contemplative act and the acts of inquiry (inventio) and judgement (via iudicii) preceding it. 
In article 4 Aquinas raises the question whether the contemplative life consists in mere 
contemplation of God, or in the consideration of any truth. Aquinas had already explained in 
article 2 that the moral virtues prepare us for the contemplative life “dispositively” (by 
assisting us in attaining serenity), although moral virtues do not belong to it “essentially.” In 
article 3 he discusses different acts which contemplation crowns, and he mentions inquiry and 
judgement. In article 4, then, he argues that contemplation of divine truth is the principal end 
of the contemplative life (with a reference to 1 Cor. 13:12), although God’s effects (in our 
created world) can assist us in attaining knowledge of God (with a reference to Rom. 1:20, 
which suggests he has philosophical contemplation in mind). Anyhow, he concludes the 
discussion in the following manner: “Accordingly, it is clear from what has been said 
[articles 2–4] that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; first the 
moral virtues [discussed in art. 2]; second, other acts exclusive of contemplation (alii actus 
praeter contemplationem) [discussed in art. 3]; third, contemplation of the divine effects 
[discussed in art. 4]; the fourth contemplative factor is the contemplation of the divine truth 
itself [ibid.].”44 Here Aquinas calls the crowning act of contemplation “a fourth” factor, 
                                                          
[Pseudo-Dionysius’]  saying (…) that the soul’s intellectual powers must be uniformly 
concentrated, in other words, that discoursing must be laid aside and the soul’s gaze fixed on 
the contemplation of the one simple truth” (cessante discursu, figatur ejus intuitus in 
contemplatio unius simplicis veritatis). 
44 ST II-II, q. 180, a. 4. I follow the Leonine edition which has “quartum vero 
contemplativum” instead of “quartum vero et completivum” (as the Blackfriars’ Edition has 
it).  
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which seems to further strengthen the claim that he seems keen to distinguish the 
contemplative act from the other acts of the intellect. Furthermore, it is remarkable that 
Aquinas calls the acts of the intellect discussed in article 3 praeter contemplationem, that is, 
acts “other than” (Blackfriars) or “exclusive of” (Shapcote’s translation) “contemplation.” 
This would further suggest that Aquinas wants to interpret the ultimate act of contemplation 
in terms distinct from, if not irreducible to, the other operations of the intellect. 
 
While I grant that these arguments regarding the exact status of the final contemplative act in 
relation to the first two operations may not be entirely conclusive, it is nonetheless clear that 
ST II-II, q. 180, a. 3 supports the view that contemplative understanding must indeed be 
characterised as simple insight into the truth in which the other three operations come to 
fulfilment. Now I want to examine in some more detail the simplicity of this act, and how its 
intellectivity is distinct from the composite nature of our ratiocinative processes. This will 
bring us to my core argument, as to why I believe Aquinas’s notion of contemplation is 
deeply indebted to Neoplatonic sources, and should not be interpreted solely in Aristotelian 
terms.  
 
II. 
 
Intellectus, Ratio and Aquinas’s Neoplatonic Sources 
 
When making the distinction between intellectus and ratio, which is central to his notion of 
contemplation as intuitus simplex, Aquinas invariably draws on the writings of Ps.-Dionysius 
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and Boethius.45 In my view, the mere fact that he only cites Neoplatonic sources should give 
us pause for thought, for Aristotle is, of course, also familiar with the distinction between 
noein and dianoeisthai (such as in De An. 429a23–4; 408b18–31).46 Moreover, the discussion 
of the distinction between ratio and intellectus usually involves an outline of the differences 
and similarities between human and angelic cognition, and again Aquinas cites consistently 
Pseudo-Dionysius.47 Given the fact that most scholars associate Aquinas’s views on 
contemplation almost exclusively with Aristotle, I will list a number of key passages in which 
he draws on non-Aristotelian sources. First, I will discuss those passages in which Aquinas 
contrasts intellectus and ratio. This distinction, as I indicated, is pivotal in his understanding 
of contemplation. Following this, I will also look at the notion of simplicity.  
 
I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, ad4 is probably one of the first texts in which Aquinas draws on 
Pseudo-Dionysius to clarify the distinction between rational and intellective beings. The 
distinction deals with our knowledge of God through created beings, including humans (as 
                                                          
45 In the sample of seventeen passages I listed earlier (see footnote 13)—which does not even 
include passages from his Commentary on The Divine Names—Aquinas refers eight times to 
Ps-Dionysius, four times to Boethius, and in six instances there is no explicit reference to a 
source. He never refers to Aristotle in this context. 
46 For a brief discussion, see Nathan R. Colaner, chapter 5 “Using the Principles: 
Contemplation and Demonstration” from Aristotle on Knowledge of Nature and Modern 
Skepticism (MD: Lexington, 2014), 104ff.  
47 In I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, ad4 he refers to De Coel. Hier. ch.4; see also Peghaire, Intellectus 
et Ratio…, 31–3.  
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made in the image of God). One of the objections quotes De Coel. Hier. IV.2,48 and states 
that we are not intellective but rational, and therefore intelligentia cannot be considered to 
cover what it means to have been made in the image of God. The Reply to the objection 
deserves to be quoted in full:  
As Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. VII) an inferior nature reaches in its pinnacle the 
lowest point of a superior nature (secondum supremum sui attingit infimum naturae 
superioris), and this is why the soul attains the lowest point of the angelic nature; and 
therefore it participates in its pinnacle somehow in intellectivity. Because the image is 
located in the best part of the soul, it is located in intelligence rather than in reason 
(secundum intelligentiam, quam secundum rationem), for reason is nothing else but 
obscured intellective nature (natura intellectualis obumbrata). This is why reason 
knows by inquiring and in temporal succession that which is presented to the intellect 
immediately and in full light (statim et plena luce).49 
Aquinas discusses the distinction between ratio and intellectus again in III Sent. d. 35, q. 2, 
a.2, qc.1 co, when dealing with intellectus as a gift of the Holy Spirit. In this context he does 
not explicitly quote Ps-Dionysius. Another early passage is from Expos. De Trin. q. 6, a. 1 (c) 
where Aquinas contrasts the rational method, characteristic of natural philosophy, to the 
                                                          
48 I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 1 ad4 quotes De Coel. Hier. IV.1, where Pseudo-Dionysius 
distinguishes between four degrees of being, namely intellective (intellectualia), rational 
(rationalia), sensible (sensibilia), and those that simply are (simplicter existentia).  
49 I Sent d. 3, q. 4, a.1, ad4; see also II Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 8, ad1 (on the Pseudo-Dionysian 
distinction between the four degrees of being): In cognitionem veritatis ratio inquirendo 
perveniat, quam intellectus simplici intuitu videt. 
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intellectual method which he attributes to metaphysics or divine science. This requires him to 
distinguish between ratio and intellectus, and he does so as follows: 
Now reason differs from intellect as multitude does from unity. Thus Boethius says 
that reasoning is related to understanding as time to eternity and as a circle to its 
centre. For it is distinctive of reason to disperse itself in the consideration of many 
 things, and to gather one simple truth from them. Thus Dionysius says: ‘Souls have 
 the power of reasoning in that they approach the truth of things from various angles, 
and in this respect they are inferior to the angels; but inasmuch as they gather a 
multiplicity into unity they are equal to the angels.’ Conversely, intellect first 
contemplates a truth one and undivided and in that truth comprehends a whole 
 multitude, as God, by knowing his essence, knows all things. Thus Dionysius says: 
‘Angelic minds have the power of intellect in that they understand divine truths in a 
unified way.’ It is clear, then, that rational thinking ends in intellectual thinking, 
following the process of analysis, in which reason gathers one simple truth from many 
things. And again, intellectual thinking is the beginning of rational thinking, following 
the process of synthesis, in which the intellect comprehends a multiplicity in unity.50 
The quotation from Boethius is from De Consol. Phil. IV, prosa 6.  The quotations from Ps-
Dionysius are from De Div. Nom. VII, no. 2. In order for the human mind to acquire 
knowledge it must begin from a simple perception of truth, such as understanding of 
principles; and we reach certainty when we examine what we have found by ‘reducing’ 
(analysis) or verifying it in light of first principles. Thus the dialectic (in the Hegelian sense 
of the word) between rest-movement-rest is described in terms of synthesis (where we grasp 
                                                          
50 Expos. De Trin. q. 6, a. 1; translation by A. Maurer from Thomas Aquinas. The Division 
and Methods of the Sciences (Toronto: PIMS, 1986), 70–1 
26 | P a g e  
 
an undivided truth in which we comprehend a multitude) and analysis (in which we grasp one 
truth from many things: ratio ex multis colligit unam et simplicem veritatem).51  For Aquinas, 
our ways of knowing reflect the structure of reality. In the order of reality, synthesis reflects 
the movement from causes to effects, while analysis reflects the movement from effects to 
causes. In the mental order, we move by synthesis from the most general or universal forms 
to more particular ones, and by analysis from more particular ones to more universal ones.52 
Incidentally, given the fact that analysis has an orientation towards the universal, which 
comes to fruition in the consideration of being and the properties of being (i.e., the objects of 
divine science), Aquinas argues in this text (Expos. De Trin. q. 6, a. 1) that thinking in divine 
science is supremely intellective, and that divine science offers the starting point of the other 
sciences: “divine science gives principles to all the other sciences, because intellective 
thinking is the starting point of rational thinking.”53 
 
It is again the writings of Boethius and Pseudo-Dionysius that Aquinas refers to in his most 
extensive treatment of the relation between ratio and intellectus, namely De Ver. q. 15, a. 1 
(“Are understanding and reason different powers in man?”). The entire reply extends to three 
pages, and cannot be discussed in detail here. This passage captures the essence of the reply: 
                                                          
51 Expos. De Trin. q. 6, a. 1; see also De Ver. q. 15, a. 1: “understanding is the source of 
reasoning in the process of discovery, and its term in that of judging” (ut sic intellectus 
inveniatur rationis principium quantum ad viam inveniendi, terminus vero quantum ad viam 
judicandi).   
52 Expos. De Trin. q. 6, a. 1; also De Ver. q. 10, a. 8, ad10; ST I, q. 79, a. 8 
53 Expos. De Trin. q. 6, a. 1. I have altered Maurer’s translation (p. 73) somewhat, replacing 
“intellectual” by “intellective.” 
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Movement is related to rest as to its source and term, as is reason, also, which is 
related to understanding as movement to rest and generation to existence, as is clear 
from the citation from Boethius [De Consol. Phil. IV, prosa 6] given above. (…) 
Consequently, although the knowledge proper to the human soul takes place through 
the process of reasoning, nevertheless, it participates to some extent in that simple 
knowledge which exists in higher substances, and because of which they are said to 
have intellective power. This is in keeping with the rule which Dionysius gives, that 
divine wisdom ‘always joins the limits of higher things to the beginning of the lower 
things.’ This is to say that the lower nature at its highest point reaches something of 
that which is the lowest in the higher nature. Dionysius also points out his difference 
between angels and souls when he says: ‘From divine wisdom the intellectual powers 
of angelic minds have pure and good acts of understanding (intellectuales 
angelicarum mentium virtutes, simplices et bonos habent intellectus), not gathering 
divine knowledge from divisible things or  the senses or extended discussions, but 
uniformly understanding the intelligible things of God.’ Later he adds about souls: 
Therefore, because of the divine wisdom, souls have rationality, too, ‘but spread out, 
circling about the truth of existing things, by the diversity of division falling short of 
unitive minds. But through the reduction of many things to one by reflection souls are 
held worthy of acts of understanding equal to those of angels, in so far as this is proper 
and possible to souls.’  
Aquinas’s sources for the distinction between ratio and intellectus are, again, Boethius54 and 
                                                          
54 Boethius’s De Consol. Phil. is quoted extensively in De Ver. q. 15, a. 1, obj 8-10. For 
instance in obj. 8 we have: intelligentia vero celsior oculus existit: supergressa namque 
universitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie intuetur.” Obj. 9 
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Ps-Dionysius. At the beginning of this paper I have already quoted ST I, q. 79, a. 8 which also 
includes references to Boethius (in reply 2) and Ps-Dionysius (in the main body). Again, in 
ST II-II, q. 180, a. 3 he quotes from The Divine Names.55 There is no need to list all the 
relevant texts. Whenever he quotes an authority to draw the distinction between ratio and 
intellectus, it is Ps-Dionyius and/or (less often) Boethius. It is clear that Aquinas does not 
refer Aristotle to explain the distinction between ratio and intellectus.                                                                                                                             
The quotation from De Ver. q. 15, a. 1 makes clear that we share to some degree in the 
intellectivity of angels. When he is discussing human cognition (as in ST I, q. 79, a. 8), 
Aquinas often draws an illuminating contrast with angelic intellectivity, thereby 
strengthening his claim that intellectivity characterises the apex of human understanding and 
contemplation.56 The Neoplatonic notion of hierarchy, and our participation in it, allows 
Aquinas to situate human cognition within a Neoplatonic setting: through the intellective 
                                                          
reads: “Praeterea, Boetius dicit in IV de consolatione: uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio; ad 
id quod est, id quod gignitur; ad aeternitatem tempus; ad punctum medium circulus: ita est 
fati series mobilis ad providentiae divinae stabilem simplicitatem. He does not refute the 
quoted texts in his replies. 
55 Obviously, one could include Aquinas’s own Commentary on the Divine Names in this list 
as well.  
56 This is by no means an obvious move. For instance, in the section “De Anima Rationali” 
from his De Homine (p. 393–473 from Cologne edition) Albert the Great did not have 
recourse to the ways in which angels know to outline human cognition and the nature of our 
intellect in particular.  
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dimension of our understanding we share, no matter how inadequately, in a hierarchy57 which 
places us within ‘touching distance’ from angels58 who enjoy “a simple view of the truth 
                                                          
57 The Neoplatonic concept of hierarchy inspired Aquinas to attribute the intellective 
dimension to humans. Aquinas would have encountered the concept of hierarchy through two 
sources: Liber de Causis, prop. 31 and the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. In Summa contra 
Gentiles II, 68.6 he again quotes from The Divine Names, writing that “divine wisdom has 
united the ends of higher things with the beginning of the lower”, and he encourages us “to 
contemplate the marvellous connection of things,” in which “it is always found that the 
lowest in the higher genus touches the highest of the lower species.” Hierarchy contributes to 
the diversity and beauty of the universe (Summa contra Gentiles III, 97.3).  Brute animals do 
not have ratio but they have natural judgement; so too, we, although mainly rational, share 
(“in a slight participation”) in the understanding which angels enjoy (De Ver. q. 15, a. 1).  
58 In De Ver. q. 8, a. 15 Aquinas compares our simple insight into first principles (without 
discourse) to the natural knowledge of angels: “There necessarily are some things in our 
intellect which it knows naturally, namely, first principles—even though in us this knowledge 
is not caused unless we receive something through our senses. Therefore, the relation of our 
intellect to those principles is similar to that which an angel has to all that he knows naturally. 
And since the knowledge we have of principles is the highest form of our knowledge, it is 
evident that on this summit of our nature we reach to some extent the lowest point of an 
angel’s. For, as Dionysius says: ‘The divine wisdom has linked the boundaries of the first 
creatures to the place where the second begin.’ (De Div. Nom., VII.3). Consequently, just as 
we know principles by simple intuition without discourse (sicut nos sine discursu principia 
cognoscimus simplici intuitu), so do the angels know all they know in the same fashion. This 
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without any discourse or inquiry.”59  Our rationality is a kind of shadow60 of the pure 
intellectivity of angels, which it mirrors, and in which it participates,61 no matter how 
imperfectly.  
At first sight the differences between human and angelic cognition appear considerable. The 
knowledge of angels is immutable (immobilis), for they directly see the pure truth by a simple 
intuition, without any discursive movement, beyond time.62 Their act of understanding is 
                                                          
is why they are called ‘intellectual’ (intellectuales), and why our habit of principles has the 
same name.” 
59 De Ver. q. 24, a. 3. Also Expos. De Trin. q. 2, a. 2: God knows “by simple intuition without 
any reasoning process.” ST I, q. 59, a. 1, ad1: “the intellect knows by simple intuition 
(simplici intuitu), while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another.” 
See also ST I, q. 79, a. 8.  
60 The metaphor of shadow, which Aquinas repeatedly uses, is derived from Isaac Israeli: 
Ratio oritur in umbra intelligentiae. (II Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 6; see also: I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a.1, 
ad4; d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad4; III Sent. d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2, ad3; Expos. De Trin. q. 1, a. 1, ad4; 
De Ver. q. 5, a. 8; q. 8, a. 3, ad3; and q. 24, a. 3. Albert the Great is familiar with this source, 
and refers to it in his Commentary on The Divine Names, VII (p. 342.81; 360.34 from 
Cologne edition) and other places (e.g., De Hom. 409.2).   
61  We are intellective per participationem (ST I, q. 108, a. 5). For the notion of participation, 
see Rudi te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: Brill, 1997) 
62 Summa contra Gentiles III, 91.5. Similarly, in Summa contra Gentiles II, 96.10: “time does 
not enter into the intellectual operation of separate substances. For just as things intelligible 
in act are without place, so, too, are they outside of time; following upon local movement, 
time measures only such things as exist somehow in place. Thus, the understanding exercised 
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simplex; they have a habitual knowledge of all they know.63 Whereas angels have an 
immediate grasp of truth beyond temporal succession (sine continuo et tempore)64 through 
the intermediary of innate intelligible species (ST I, q. 55, a. 2), we know through the 
intermediary of the sensible species in a discursive manner. Nonetheless, we too share in 
intellectivity: “The human soul, according to what is highest in it, attains to that which is 
proper to angelic nature, so that it knows some things at once and without investigation 
(anima humana, quantum ad id quod in ipsa supremum est, aliquid attingit de eo quod 
proprium est angelicae naturae; scilicet ut aliquorum cognitionem habeat subito et sine 
inquisitione) although it is lower than angels in this, that it can know the truth in these things 
only by receiving something from sense.”65  
The previous discussion raises the question: why would Aquinas have drawn on Ps-Dionysius 
and Boethius rather than on Aristotle to develop the intellective notion of contemplation? We 
can only speculate about the reasons why Aquinas, as a matter of fact, does not appeal to 
                                                          
by a separate substance is above time; whereas time touches our intellectual operation, 
through the fact that we obtain knowledge from phantasms, which have a determinate 
temporal reference.” 
63 De Malo q. 16, a. 5; ST I, q. 64, a. 2; De Ver. q. 16, a. 1 
64 III Sent. d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 
65 De Ver. q. 16, a. 1; cf. also De Malo q. 16, a. 5; De Ver. q. 8, a. 15. Before I leave this 
discussion of angelic cognition, it should be pointed out that there are Christological and 
eschatological aspects involved as well. The blessed before the resurrection can know 
without recourse to phantasms. Christ too, who was both comprehensor and viator, did not 
have to rely on discursive reasoning to acquire knowledge, as he enjoyed divinely infused 
knowledge. (ST III, q. 11, a. 2 and 3; see also De Ver. q. 10, a. 11, ad3).   
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Aristotle in this context—for he gives us no indication. Moreover, an in-depth answer to this 
question would require an exhaustive comparison of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s views on 
contemplation, scientia, intellectus and sapientia—an enterprise I cannot undertake within 
the confines of this paper. Still, we can hint at a possible answer.  
Aristotle uses nous both in a general sense to include all operations of reason (e.g. 429a23), 
and to refer to a non-discursive apprehension of first principles, as distinct from dianoia 
(discursive reasoning). When he uses it in a more restricted sense, such as in Posterior 
Analytics, nous (intellectus) refers to grasping first principles, which are necessary to 
generate the reasoning process in the first place, and avoid an infinite regress. Given the fact 
that Aristotle too acknowledges the non-discursive nature of nous, which simply accepts 
certain principles without argument or deduction, why then does Aquinas refer to 
Neoplatonic sources when discussing intellective contemplation?  
Specifically in the context of contemplation a characteristic (and well-known) passage from 
Nicomachean Ethics VI.6 (1140b31-1141a8) may suggest an answer.66 Here Aristotle 
discusses the intellectual virtues of nous (intellectus), episteme (scientia), and sophia 
(sapientia); the latter is the most excellent and characteristic virtue of the contemplative 
person. He explains that because episteme involves reason (meta logou) the insight into first 
principles is not a matter of episteme but of nous: “what is scientifically known is 
demonstrable” while first principles are not. Thus, the end-result of demonstrative reasoning 
is called episteme (scientia), and it always presupposes reasoning (meta logou): scientia is 
from conclusions, intellectus from principles.  After having reiterated that “understanding and 
                                                          
66 While the main discussion of contemplation can be found in Bk X, for our purposes the 
discussion in Bk VI is more rewarding as this is where Aristotle explicitly deals with the 
intellectual virtues. 
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not reasoning deals with first principles,” he adds: “nor is wisdom [exclusively] about 
origins; for it is proper to the wise person to have a demonstration of some things” 
(apodeixis).67 He then goes on to describe wisdom as the combination of understanding and 
episteme: “the wise person must not only know what is derived from the origins of a science, 
but also grasp the truth about the origins. Therefore wisdom is understanding plus scientific 
knowledge.” These passages indicate that not just episteme but sophia as well (as the 
combination of intellective apprehension of principles and demonstrative reasoning) remains 
intrinsically linked with apodeixis, and remain therefore non-simple or composite.  In short, 
Aristotle generally associates the outcome of the demonstrative reasoning process with 
episteme, rather than with nous: nous is primarily concerned with principles68 while 
episteme/science is the outcome of demonstrative reasoning.69 Also, it seems doubtful that, 
for Aristotle, episteme (which is essentially a grasp of demonstration, cf. Post. An. I.2) can be 
simple. The same applies, I suspect, to Aristotle’s sophia (as the combination of nous and 
episteme), which remains apodeictic. Aquinas, at least in his own theological syntheses (as 
distinct from the Commentaries on Aristotle) explicitly allows for the possibility that the 
outcome of our reasoning process  can be simple or non-composite, and he draws on 
Neoplatonic sources—especially Pseudo-Dionysius—to make this point. For Aquinas, there 
are instances in which both science and wisdom can be simple or non-composite. I will 
                                                          
67 Nicomachean Ethics, 1141a1-3. I have made use of the translation by Terence Irwin, 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (IN: Indianapolis, 1985), 156–7 
68 Post. An., 100b5 
69 In Aquinas’s words—when commenting on Aristotle’s De Anima 428a16-18, III, lect.5 
(no. 648): “simple understanding bears upon first principles, and science upon demonstrated 
conclusions.”  
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suggest that Aquinas had good reasons—albeit theological ones—to identify contemplation 
with a simple understanding of truth rather than with Aristotelian scientia or sapientia, which 
remain composite.  
In his Commentary on the Divine Names, ch. 7, no. 711ff. Aquinas draws a clear contrast 
between the composite nature of the two reasoning processes, and the simplicity of 
intellective insight. Both the via inventionis and the via iudicii are composite.70 Again he 
draws an analogy with angelic cognition, and concludes with a clear assertion of the 
simplicity of human understanding: “the inquiry of reason ends in a simple understanding of 
truth (inquisitio enim rationis ad simplicem intelligentiam veritatis terminatur), just as it 
begins from a simple understanding of truth considered in the first principles. It is for this 
reason that in the process of reasoning there is a reflective movement (convolutio) similar to a 
circle, as reason, starting from unity (ab uno), proceeding through multiplicity, ends at 
oneness.”71     
In summary, Aquinas calls the via inventionis and via iudicii composite; but these operations 
of the intellect presuppose, and culminate in, a simple understanding. An answer to our 
question why Aquinas refers to Neoplatonic sources (such as Ps-Dionysius or Boethius) 
                                                          
70 Commentary on The Divine Names, no. 711: duplex compositio intellectus: una quidem 
quae pertinet ad inventionem veritatis, alia vero quae pertinet ad iudicium. The way Aquinas 
characterises judgement here (“we proceed from a universal principle to apply it to multiple 
and particular realities which are its effect”: In iudicio, vero, procedimus ab aliquo communi 
principio ad praedicta multa et divisibilia sive particularia sui effectus et signa) appears 
somewhat different from other texts discussed in this paper, such as Expos. De Trin, q. 6, a. 1 
and ST I, q.79, a. 8. 
71 Commentary on The Divine Names, no. 713; see also ST II-II, q. 180, a. 6, ad2 
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rather than to Aristotle when treating of the theme of simple or non-composite nature of 
understanding (which constitutes the essential dimension of contemplation), now suggests 
itself. The reason may be that the outcome of Aristotelian reasoning remains too apodeictic 
for Aquinas, and therefore cannot fully accommodate his notion simplex intuitus, a simple 
apprehension of (divine) truth.   
It must be said that it is not entirely clear from where Aquinas adopted this notion of intuitus 
simplex—that is, if it is not his own. When distinguishing between discernere, cogitare and 
intelligere, he seems to associate the characterisation of intelligere as simplex intuitus with 
the writings of Augustine (cf. I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 5) but scholars have been unable to find its 
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source.72 As we have seen, he usually associates it with the writings of Ps-Dionysius.73 We 
                                                          
72 The full quote is: Respondeo dicendum, quod, secundum Augustinum, De util. 
Credendi, cap. XI, differunt cogitare, discernere et intelligere. Discernere est cognoscere rem 
per differentiam sui ab aliis. Cogitare autem est considerare rem secundum partes et 
proprietates suas: unde cogitare dicitur quasi coagitare. Intelligere autem dicit nihil aliud 
quam simplicem intuitum intellectus in id quod sibi est praesens intelligibile. The reference to 
De Util. Cred. is unhelpful for our purposes. See also: I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, c. 49: Intelligere 
nihil aliud est quam simplicem intuitum intellectus in id quod sibi est praesens intelligibile; I 
Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, c. 50: Intelligere nihil aliud dicit quam intuitum, qui nihil aliud est quam 
praesentia intelligibilis ad intellectum quocumque modo; I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, ad5: 
Intelligere autem dicit intueri. Perhaps a remote inspiration here was the Pseudo-Augustinian 
De Spiritu et Anima, chs 1 and 23, which Aquinas quotes in De Ver. q. 15, a. 1: “the sight of 
the soul by which it looks at the true” (quo per seipsum verum intuetur; ratiocinatio autem 
est rationis inquisitio)—although Aquinas expressed doubts about the authenticity of this 
work. 
73 Aquinas quotes Pseudo-Dionysius (from De Div. Nom. IV, 8) for instance, in De Ver. q. 8, 
a. 15: Ut enim dicit Dionysius, VII de Divin. Nomin., divina sapientia fines primorum 
coniungit principiis secundorum. Unde sicut nos sine discursu principia cognoscimus 
simplici intuitu, ita et Angeli omnia quae cognoscunt; unde et intellectuales dicuntur. In ST 
II-II, q. 8, a. 1, obj. 2 he also refers to De Div. Nom. VII for the distinction between 
discursive and multiple reasoning and a knowledge in a simple manner (simpliciter) through 
intellectus: “the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of 
understanding) but discursively (which is a sign of reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. 
VII).”   
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should not ignore the source Aquinas himself refers to when he characterises contemplation 
as simplex intuitus veritatis, namely Richard of St Victor, who is being quoted as saying that 
“contemplation is the soul’s penetrating  and free gaze on things perceived” (perispicax et 
liber contuitus animi in res  perspiciendas).  None of these authors, however, uses the exact 
phrase intuitus simplex. Aquinas’s teacher, Albert the Great, uses the term simplex intuitus a 
number of times, but mostly in his late Summa Theologiae rather than in earlier works, which 
should make us hesitant in assuming that Albert influenced Aquinas; it may very well be the 
other way around.74  In summary, scholars have not been able to trace the exact textual source 
                                                          
74 A scholarly paper examining the relation between Albert and Aquinas on contemplation 
(and the role of simplex intuitus) would be highly desirable. There is one instance of intuitus 
simplex in his Commentary on the Sentences (in I Sent. d. 3, a. 29, p. 130a, on self-
understanding in the context of a discussion of the circumincession of memoria, intellectus 
and voluntas, where Albert also refers to Augustine: Intelligere vero nihil aliud quam notitiae 
specie vel essentia notitiae se intueri simpliciter sine consideratione sui et discretione suae 
naturae, quia hoc vocat Augustinus intelligere se: et discernere se et cogitare se plus 
secundum eum dicunt quam intelligere se. Cum igitur intelligere se non ponat discretionem 
sui, sed simplicem intuitum sine discretione et cogitatione, dico quod non ponit conversionem 
intellectus.) Albert uses the phrase intuitus simplex mostly in his Summa Theologiae, usually 
to refer to divine cognition:  Pars I, tract. 3, q. 13, m. 1 (p. 56a, on our knowledge of God’s 
essence), tract. 3, q. 13, m. 4 (p. 65b, on knowing God face to face); tract. 15, q. 60, m. 2 (p. 
604a, on divine cognition); tract. 15, q. 60, m. 4, a. 1 (p. 614a, on divine cognition) and a. 2 
(p. 617a, id.); tract. 17, q. 67, m. 2 (p. 681a, on divine providence) and m. 3 (p. 685, id.). 
Most of these texts relate to knowledge of God. See also Part II tract. 4, q. 14, m. 3 a. 2, 
partic. 1 (p.180a, on angelic knowledge) and tract. 15, q. 93, m. 2, (p. 203a, with a reference 
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of the phrase intuitus simplex. Boethius and Ps-Dionysius use the phrase 
intelligentia/intellectus simplex rather than intuitus simplex. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
Aquinas himself, when explaining the phrase, refers to the writings of Ps-Dionysius, 
Boethius, Richard of St Victor, and (pseudo-)Augustinian works (De Spiritu et Anima), but 
not Aristotle.  As suggested, a possible reason for this is that the outcome of demonstrative 
reasoning is scientific knowledge: episteme is a grasp of demonstration, and thus it cannot be 
simple. Wisdom, too, as a combination of nous and episteme may remain irretrievably linked 
to compositeness: “it is proper to the wise person to have a demonstration of things” 
(apodeixis). 
 
III. 
Towards a More Inclusive Notion of Contemplation: Theological Concerns 
                                                          
to Augustine: Et a Dionysio dicitur habere discursas scientas, et non simplices et deiformed: 
quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, in Deo non sunt cogitationes volubiles hinc illinc, aut inde huc : 
sed omnia uno intuitu et simplici in seipso videt et scit.) In Part II, tract. 4, q. 14, m. 3 a. 2, 
part 1 (p. 180a) he says about angels: Unde boni Angeli ad cognoscendas res singulares non 
indigent inquisitione, sed simplici intuitu per exemplar artis divinae cognoscunt ea. In short, 
Albert applies the notion of simplex intuitus mostly to divine or (occasionally) angelic 
cognition, and (rarely) to human cognition, and then only when discussing the beatific vision. 
I have quoted from Borgnet edition Alberti Magni Opera Omnia (Paris, 1890–‘99). When 
Albert uses the notion simplex intuitus, he refers to Ps-Dionysius as well. In Topica, Lib. I 
cap. 1, for instance, we read: Propter quod dicit Dionysius quod discursus est disciplina 
rationis: simplex autem veritatis intuitus est intellectus.  
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I have attempted to show that Aquinas invariably refers to Neoplatonic sources to argue for 
the intellective nature of human cognition, which, as we have seen, is central to his notion of 
contemplation. This raises the broader question: why exactly does intuitus simplex occupy 
such a pivotal role in Aquinas’s understanding of contemplation? I will conclude this 
contribution by hinting at a number of possible (theological) reasons. 
Emphasising the intellective, simple, and non-discursive nature of human cognition has a 
number of advantages. First, as indicated earlier, it makes clear that to the degree that we, 
too, are intellective, we share in a hierarchy which puts us within touching distance of angels, 
who are entirely intellective. This matters to Aquinas for whom hierarchy adds to the beauty 
of the created world.75  
More importantly, it further supports his view that there is continuity between our ways of 
knowing on earth, and the beatific vision. The intellective dimension of contemplation on 
earth prefigures our non-discursive ways of knowing God in the after-life. This kind of 
continuity mattered to Aquinas the theologian, for whom grace perfects nature but does not 
abolish it. Thus, the intellective nature of contemplation enables Aquinas to argue more 
cogently that contemplation on earth is an inchoative sharing in heavenly beatitude.76  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the issue of inclusivity of contemplation. For 
Aristotle, the final acme of our reasoning processes appears to remain linked with 
demonstration and knowledge of causes. For Aquinas the culmination of contemplation is 
                                                          
75 Summa contra Gentiles III, 97.3 
76 See ST II-II, q. 180, a. 4: inchoatio beatitudinis, quae hic incipit ut in futuro terminetur.  
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clearly intuitive or non-discursive.77 In my view it is here that the notions of simplicity and 
intuitus simplex are of particular significance: Aquinas is willing to defend notions of 
scientia, intellectus and sapientia that are utterly non-composite and non-discursive, 
especially when he discusses the cognitive gifts of the Holy Spirit.  
Given the fact that an exhaustive discussion of the gifts of the Holy Spirit is beyond the 
confines of this paper, I will focus for present purposes exclusively on Aquinas’s treatment of 
the cognitive gifts of the Holy Spirit in the latter parts of the Summa Theologiae. As is well-
known, Aquinas changed his views on the gifts of the Holy Spirit throughout his career. It 
was only towards the end of his career that he appended the gifts to their relevant theological 
and cardinal virtues. The cognitive gifts of intellectus (II-II, q. 8) and scientia (II-II, q. 9) are 
appended to the theological virtue of faith, while sapientia (II-II, q. 45) is discussed in the 
context of charity, and concilium (II-II, q. 52) is associated with prudence.  
Aquinas refers to the two operations of the intellect to clarify the distinction between the gifts 
of understanding and knowledge. The gift of understanding is an instance of the first 
                                                          
77 See also this early text: III Sent. d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2: “The contemplative life consists in 
the activity that one assumes (acceptat) above all others. (…) Now, the inquiry of reason 
(inquisitio rationis) proceeds from a simple regard of the intellect (a simplici intuitu 
intellectus progreditur)—for one proceeds by starting out from principles which the intellect 
holds; so too the intellect attains certainty when the conclusions it draws can revert back to 
the principles through which the intellect attained certainty. This is why the contemplative 
life consists primarily in the operation of the intellect (Et ideo vita contemplativa 
principaliter in operatione intellectus consistit): the very word ‘contemplation’ suggests this 
as it denotes ‘vision.’ The contemplative person, however, uses rational inquiry (inquisitione 
rationis) so as to attain the vision of contemplation, which is his main goal.” 
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operation (the apprehension of quiddity). It involves a certain perception of the truth,78 “an 
excellence of cognition that penetrates into the heart of things” (excellentia cognitionis 
penetrantis ad intima).79 
The first objection of ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1 is particularly relevant for our purposes: given the 
fact that humans know truth discursively (discursive), which we associate with ratio rather 
than knowing simply (simpliciter), which we usually connect with intellectus, we should 
speak of ‘the gift of reason’ (donum rationis) rather than ‘the gift of understanding’ 
(intellectus). In reply, Aquinas reiterates that our reasoning proceeds from, and ends in, 
understanding. We speak of the gift of understanding (rather than reason) because the gift of 
understanding is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what the natural light is in 
regards to the things we know intuitively and primordially. Thus, the gift of understanding 
assists us in immediately perceiving the truth (perceptio veritatis), and piercing with the mind 
(mente penetrare) into the principles of faith.80 
It should not strike us as particularly surprising that the gift of understanding is non-
discursive. After all, the same can be said about the intellectual virtue of understanding. More 
significant is how Aquinas characterises the gifts of knowledge and wisdom. The first 
objection in article 1 of question 9 of the Secunda Secundae—the article raises the question 
whether scientia is a gift—cites An. Post. I, 2 (71b18), where Aristotle writes that 
demonstration is a syllogism producing scientia. Whereas science is the result (effectum) of 
our natural reasoning efforts, the gift of knowledge surpasses our natural ability. In his reply, 
Aquinas, while acknowledging that human science is acquired by means of demonstration, 
                                                          
78 ST II-II, q. 8, a. 5 ad3 
79 ST II-II, q. 8, a. 1 ad3 
80 ST II-II, q. 8, a. 6 ad2 
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argues that the gift of the Holy Spirit is a participated likeness in the divine way of knowing, 
which is non-discursive and simple: 
In God there is a sure judgement of truth without any discursive process, by simple 
intuition (absque omni discursu per simplicem intuitum). Therefore, God’s knowledge 
is not discursive, or ratiocinative, but absolute and simple (non est discursiva vel 
ratiocinativa, sed absoluta et simplex), to which that knowledge is likened which is a 
gift of the Holy Spirit, since it is a participated likeness thereof (participata simulitudo 
ipsius).81 
In short, the non-discursive or intuitive nature of the gift of knowledge is one of the key 
features that distinguishes it from the intellectual virtue of scientia. 
Following Augustine, Aquinas distinguishes between the gifts of knowledge and wisdom by 
linking the former with the cognition of things created, and the latter of things divine.82  
Whereas the gift of knowledge pertains to judgements of created things, the gifts of 
understanding and wisdom, then, are particularly relevant for our contemplation of divine 
truth.83 I have already outlined the non-discursive nature of the gift of intellectus. It is now 
time to examine the gift of sapientia. 
The virtue of wisdom and the gift of wisdom both involve judgement according to divine 
                                                          
81 ST II-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad1 
82 Augustine, De Trin. XIII, 24. In De Trin. XII, 21-25 Augustine had also associated wisdom 
with contemplation and knowledge with action, making an interesting distinction between 
intellective cognition of eternal things (wisdom), and rational cognition of temporal things 
(knowledge). For Aquinas’s comments, see for instance his Commentary on Col. 2:3, no. 81. 
83 ST II-II, q. 9, a. 4, ad3 
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norms. The gift of wisdom, however, is characterised by an intuitive judgement, which 
distinguishes it from the intellectual virtue of wisdom: “It belongs to the wisdom that is an 
intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgement about divine things after reason has made its 
inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit to judge aright about them on 
account of connaturality with them.”84 Aquinas quotes Ps-Dionysius’s remark from The 
Divine Names ch.2 about Hierotheus who “suffered divine things” through a connaturality or 
sympathy, which results from the unity with God that charity effects.85 In this context 
Aquinas draws a well-known analogy between right judgement in matters of chastity after a 
reasoning process, and an instinctive or intuitive awareness how to judge when one has the 
habit of chastity. Aquinas’s theme of connaturality is well-known.86 For our purposes it 
suffices to state that the gift of wisdom, as connatural, is intuitive and non-discursive.  
Yet it is the gift of wisdom which is of central importance in the contemplation of God. 
Through charity we are intimately united with God, and through the gift of wisdom which 
flows from charity, we are directed towards contemplation of God (as well as proper 
action).87 
Aquinas’s notion of contemplation incorporates central insights from Aristotle. It is, however, 
                                                          
84 ST II-II, q. 45, a. 2 
85 ST II-II, q. 45, a. 2 
86 Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. 2. Spiritual Master (Washington DC, The 
Catholic University of America, 2003), 206–24; and Taki Suto, “Virtue and Knowledge: 
Connatural Knowledge according to Thomas Aquinas” from The Review of Metaphysics 58 
(2004): 61–79. The work of Linda Zagzebski is also relevant in this context. 
87 ST II-II, q. 45, a. 3, ad1 and ad3 (ad sapientiam pertinet contemplatio divinorum, quae est 
visio principii); II-II, q. 45, a. 5.  
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overall far more inclusive. It can accommodate the contemplation of both the philosopher 
who pursues knowledge and wisdom through discursive reasoning, and the illiterate vetula 
who grasps and subscribes to central articles of the Christian faith—even though she may not 
be able to reason about them, or refute arguments against them; she just sees their 
truthfulness. In III Sent. d. 36, q. 1, a. 3, ad5 (no. 12831) Aquinas explicitly states that all 
Christians—most of whom do not have the philosophical or theological skills to engage in 
reasoning and demonstrative argumentation about what they believe—are called to 
participate in contemplation: “Although all those who are in the active life do not attain to a 
perfect state of contemplation, every Christian who is in a state of salvation must participate 
somehow in contemplation, for the commandment is given to all: ‘Be still, and see that I am 
God.’” (Ps. 45:11). He interprets the third commandment (keeping the Sabbath) in terms of 
this universal call to contemplation.88 Similarly, in Summa contra Gentiles I, 6 he rejoices in 
the fact that “inspiration [is] given to human minds, so that simple and untutored persons, 
filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, come to possess instantaneously the highest wisdom…” 
(ut idiotae et simplices, dono spiritus sancti repleti, summam sapientiam et facundiam in 
instanti consequerentur). It further explains why Aquinas considered the Virgin Mary as 
excelling in contemplation—a view that Aristotle undoubtedly would have found rather 
puzzling.89  
                                                          
88 III Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 3, ad5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis ad perfectum statum 
contemplationis non perveniat omnis qui in vita activa est; tamen omnis Christianus qui in 
statu salutis est, oportet quod aliquid de contemplatione participet, cum praeceptum sit 
omnibus: vacate, et videte quoniam ego sum Deus, Psal. 45, 2; ad quod etiam est tertium 
praeceptum legis. 
89 Sermon Puer Iesus. See also ST III, q. 27, a. 5, ad3. 
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Contemplation is the goal of our entire life (finis totius vitae). It is a foretaste of heavenly 
beatitude.90 All Christians are called to contemplation but not all Christians have the 
intellectual capabilities to argue in a rational way about their faith. Hence, Aquinas must 
make allowances for a kind of contemplative act which is non-discursive and which is 
available to all Christians through the gifts of the Holy Spirit.  This explains why the non-
discursive notion of intuitive understanding he encountered in the writings of his Neoplatonic 
sources would have appealed to him. The broad understanding of contemplation as intuitus 
simplex can incorporate the acts of contemplation of the Greek sage, as well as those of the 
vetula who enjoys the benefit of her Christian faith, enabling her to know truths which the 
philosopher comes to know, if at all, with great difficulty and after laborious reasoning 
processes.91  
 
Mary Immaculate College,  
Limerick, Ireland. 
                                                          
90 See ST I-II, q. 3, a. 7, ad3 and ST II-II, q. 180, a. 4: inchoatio beatitudinis. 
91 See Sermon Attendite a falsis, pars 2: Plus scit modo una vetula de his quae ad fidem 
pertinent, quam quondam omnes philosophi. See also Sermon Beati qui habitant, where 
Aquinas contrasts the labours of the philosopher with the short-cut offered by our Lord: 
Veritatem cognoscere nisi sunt per exercitium studii. Sed Deus breviorem viam docet, scilicet 
per cordis mundiciam dicens: beati mundo corde et cetera. 
